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Counterfactual reasoning has been
argued to provide an adaptive advantage
for human action. Here, Laurent and
Balleine show that rats can reason
counterfactually. They demonstrate that
rats can encode consequences that their
actions do not produce and can use that
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The capacity to extract causal knowledge from the
environment allows us to predict future events and
to use those predictions to decide on a course of ac-
tion [1]. Although evidence of such causal reasoning
has long been described [2], recent evidence sug-
gests that using predictive knowledge to guide deci-
sion-making in this way is predicated on reasoning
about causes in two quite distinct ways: choosing
an action can be based on the interaction between
predictive information and the consequences of
that action, or, alternatively, actions can be selected
based on the consequences that they do not pro-
duce [3–5]. The latter counterfactual reasoning is
highly adaptive because it allows us to use informa-
tion about both present and absent events to guide
decision-making [6, 7]. Nevertheless, although there
is now evidence to suggest that animals other than
humans, including rats and birds, can engage in
causal reasoning of one kind or another [8–10], there
is currently no evidence that they use counterfactual
reasoning to guide choice. To assess this question,
we gave rats the opportunity to learn new action-
outcome relationships, after which we probed the
structure of this learning by presenting excitatory
and inhibitory cues predicting that the specific out-
comes of their actions would either occur or would
not occur. Whereas the excitors biased choice
toward the action delivering the predicted outcome,
the inhibitory cues selectively elevated actions
predicting the absence of the inhibited outcome,
suggesting that rats encoded the counterfactual ac-
tion-outcome mappings and were able to use them
to guide choice.
RESULTS
To assess whether evidence of counterfactual reasoning can be
found in animals, we took advantage of a paradigm developed in
rats to assess the influence of predictive learning on choice be-
tween actions that earn otherwise similarly valued outcomes.1074 Current Biology 25, 1074–1079, April 20, 2015 ª2015 Elsevier LThis paradigm, called Pavlovian-instrumental transfer, typically
reveals that an event predictive of a particular outcome biases
choice toward actions that earn the same outcome [11].
Although this finding suggests that rats can use predictive infor-
mation to guide choice, it does not provide any direct evidence of
counterfactual reasoning; whereas considerable evidence sug-
gests that rats can encode specific action-outcome relation-
ships [12, 13], there is currently no evidence that they encode
the outcomes that an action does not produce. To ask this ques-
tion in the context of Pavlovian-instrumental transfer, we framed
it in a different way: in addition to positive predictions, we pro-
vided rats with information that a specific outcome would not
occur and assessed how they modified their choice of action
in the face of this information. Research in animal learning has
found essentially three ways to establish a stimulus as a negative
predictor. The first is by presenting the stimulus whenever a
predicted outcome is omitted, called a feature-negative design
[14, 15]; the second is by presenting the predictive stimulus
whenever there is a reduction in the value of the expected
outcome, called overexpectation [16]; and, the third is by
reversing the usual causal order of stimulus and outcome, i.e.,
by backward conditioning [17]. In the current study, we used
all three methods and assessed the effects of both the positive
and the negative predictions on choice.
If, in the course of learning about actions and their various out-
comes, i.e., during instrumental conditioning, rats are sensitive
to counterfactual information, then we anticipate that they will
learn not only what outcome is earned by performing a specific
action but also what outcomes that action does not earn. The
critical question is what the rats do when given information about
the absence of a specific outcome. If they do not reason counter-
factually, then such information should do no more than inhibit
actions associated with the absent outcome. If, however, rats
can reason counterfactually, then, in the presence of information
about the absence of a specific outcome, they should be ex-
pected to increase their performance of actions that they have
learned predict the absence of that outcome.
Experiment 1: Positive and Negative Predictions
Derived from Feature-Negative Learning Exert
Opposing Effects on Choice
Experiment 1 used a feature-negative or conditioned inhibition
design to establish unique positive and negative predictors of
two distinct outcomes and then evaluated their influence on
choice between actions. The design is presented in Figure 1Atd All rights reserved
Figure 1. The Effect of Negative Predictions
on Choice
(A) Design of the experiment using a feature-
negative, conditioned inhibition procedure to
generate negative predictors (n = 24). Abbrevia-
tions are as follows: S1/S2, noise and clicker
stimuli (counterbalanced); S3/S4, house-light and
tone stimuli (counterbalanced); O1/O2, food pellet
and sugar outcomes (counterbalanced); Ø, no
outcome; A1/A2, instrumental lever press actions
on a left lever and right lever (counterbalanced).
(B) Performance during the various predictive
stimuli was assessed relative to performance in the
absence of the predictors by subtracting this latter
baseline activity to reveal the net effect of the
predictive cues on choice and the vigor of action
selection. Positive (S1/S2) and negative (S3/S4)
predictors had a distinct influence on choice
between actions (F(1,23) = 7.17, p < 0.05). The positive predictors biased choice toward the action (i.e., Same) with which they shared a common outcome (F(1,23) =
10.77, p < 0.05) and elevated the performance of that action above baseline, whereas the negative predictors failed to trigger any significant preference between
the two actions (F < 1.5).
(C) Incongruent (S1S4/S2S3) and congruent (S1S3/S2S4) compounds exerted an opposite effect on choice (F(1,23) = 25.16, p < 0.05). The former increased
responding on the Same action, which previously earned the outcome signaled by the positive predictor embedded in the compound (F(1,23) = 12.03, p < 0.05). In
contrast, the congruent compound biased choice away from the Same action toward the Different action and increased the performance of that action above
baseline, which was associated with the absence of the outcome that the compound stimuli signaled would not occur (F(1,23) = 9.71, p < 0.05).
Error bars denote ±1 SEM.and had three stages. The first stage involved Pavlovian training
during which two stimuli, S1 and S2, were trained as Pavlovian
excitors through pairings with the two distinct food outcomes,
O1 and O2. Another two stimuli, S3 and S4, were trained as
conditioned inhibitors of O1 and O2, respectively. This was
achieved by repeatedly presenting two compounds, S1S3 and
S2S4, in the absence of either outcome. As a consequence,
we hoped to establish S3 as a predictor of ‘‘no O1’’ (S3 was pre-
sentedwhenever the S1 prediction of O1was disconfirmed) and,
for similar reasons, to establish S4 as a predictor of ‘‘no O2.’’ The
rats were then trained to perform the two lever press actions, A1
and A2, to deliver the two outcomes; i.e., A1 earned O1, whereas
A2 earned O2, such that, by implication, A1 did not earn O2, and
A2 did not earn O1. To establish whether rats encoded these
counterfactual relationships and could use them to guide choice,
we conducted a single test in which the levers were available but
pressing them did not result in outcome delivery. This allowed us
to assess the effects of the stimuli on choice in the absence of
specific feedback. The positive and negative predictors were
presented either alone or in compound. The compound trials
were critical to establish the role of counterfactual reasoning
because, in these trials, information was presented either
congruent with training—where the negative predictor was
congruent with the positive prediction, i.e., S1S3 and S2S4—or
incongruent with training, such that the negative predictor was
incongruent with the positive prediction, i.e., S1S4 and S2S3.
Thus, in congruent trials, the positive and negative predictions
related to the same outcome, e.g., S1 predicting O1 with S3
predicting O1 would be omitted, whereas in incongruent trials,
they related to different outcomes, e.g., S1 predicting O1 and
S4 predicting O2would be omitted, leaving a net positive predic-
tion for O1.
Training data from the first two phases are presented in Fig-
ure S1. The data of most interest, those from the transfer test,
are shown in Figures 1B and 1C. They are plotted as the meanCurrent Biology 25, 107number of lever presses per minute when the stimulus or the
compound predicted the delivery, or the absence, of the same
outcome of the action (Same) and when the stimulus or the com-
pound predicted the delivery, or the absence, of the different
outcome from the action (Different). Thus, A1 was identified as
‘‘Same’’ and A2 as ‘‘Different’’ in the presence of S1, S3, or
S1S3. Conversely, A2 was labeled as ‘‘Same’’ and A1 as
‘‘Different’’ during S2, S4, or S2S4. Further, baseline responding
was subtracted from these rates of responding in order to reveal
the net increase in choice performance; i.e., the net effect of the
predictive stimuli. Baseline was defined as the mean number of
lever presses per minute on both actions when the stimuli or
compounds were absent (see Supplemental Information for
more details). Consistent with the literature, predictive informa-
tion about O1 and O2 derived from S1 and S2 was found to
bias performance toward the action that previously predicted
the same outcome, i.e., A1 and A2, respectively (Figure 1B).
Although S3 and S4 alone produced only a modest bias (Fig-
ure 1B), the critical question was how the rats would respond
during the congruent versus the incongruent compounds. As
both compounds predicted the absence of any subsequent
outcome, it is possible they would inhibit responding on both
levers. In fact, whereas the incongruent compounds biased
choice in much the same manner as S1 and S2 alone, the
congruent compounds not only biased choice in the opposite
direction, they elevated the performance of that action above
baseline, providing evidence that the rats not only encoded the
counterfactual relationships but were able to use these relation-
ships flexibly to alter their action selection on test (Figure 1C).
Rather than inhibiting both actions, rats elevated their perfor-
mance on the lever not delivering the outcome the compound
predicted would be omitted. It is the complete reversal of S1
and S2’s effect on choice that was induced by the congruent
compound that provides the strongest evidence the rats
engaged in counterfactual reasoning; not only were they4–1079, April 20, 2015 ª2015 Elsevier Ltd All rights reserved 1075
Figure 2. Negative Predictions Induced by
Overexpectation
(A) The overexpectation procedure used to
generate negative predictors (n = 32). Abbrevia-
tions are the same as those in the legend of
Figure 1.
(B) Positive (S1/S2) and negative (S3/S4) pre-
dictors exerted the opposite influence on choice
between actions (F(1,31) = 20.73, p < 0.05). The
positive predictors biased choice toward the ac-
tion with which they shared a common outcome
(i.e., Same) (F(1,31) = 9.54, p < 0.05), whereas re-
sponding on the Same action remained low in the
presence of the negative predictors. In contrast,
the latter stimuli directed choice toward the
Different action, which was associated with the
absence of the outcome that the stimuli also
signaled would not occur (F(1,31) = 13.30, p < 0.05).
(C) Incongruent (S1S4/S2S3) and congruent (S1S3/S2S4) compounds also had opposing effects on choice (F(1,31) = 11.37, p < 0.05). Incongruent compounds
promoted responding on the Same action, which previously delivered the outcome signaled by the positive predictor embedded in the compound (F(1,31) = 5.64,
p < 0.05). In contrast, the congruent compound both biased choice away from the Same action and elevated the performance of Different action (F(1,31) = 11.87,
p < 0.05), which was associated with the absence of the outcome that the compound stimuli signaled would not occur.
Error bars denote ±1 SEM.sensitive to the specific negative predictors, but they could
clearly use the information they conveyed (i.e., ‘‘no O1’’ or ‘‘no
O2’’) to perform the alternative action.
Experiment 2: Overexpectation Produces Specific
Negative Predictions that Reverse Choice
In addition to demonstrating counterfactual reasoning, the re-
sults from our first study showed that predictions about the
absence of a specific outcome can be generated when that
outcome is unexpectedly omitted. We used a similar logic in
our next experiment to generate a specific negative predictor
through overexpectation [16]. The design is presented in Fig-
ure 2A and, to the best of our knowledge, constitutes the first
attempt to demonstrate an outcome-specific overexpectation
effect. During the Pavlovian conditioning phase, a new set of
naive rats again learned that S1 and S2 predicted O1 and O2,
respectively. However, in this study, rats were also exposed to
two compounds each composed of the two excitors (S1 and
S2) plus a novel stimulus, either S3 or S4. One compound,
S1S2S3, was paired with O2, whereas S1S2S4 was paired
with O1. We assumed that combined exposure to S1 and S2
would predict the delivery of both O1 and O2. However, as O1
was omitted in the presence of S3 and O2 in the presence of
S4, we hoped that these stimuli would become negative predic-
tors of O1 and O2, respectively.
Using these stimuli, we applied the same logic as the previous
study to assess the influence of positive and negative predictors
of the two outcomes on choice between the two lever press ac-
tions. The rats were given lever press training as previously
described and then tested using the two positive predictors,
S1 and S2, and the same congruent and incongruent com-
pounds used in the previous study (i.e., S1S3 and S2S4 versus
S1S4 and S2S3) to provide information about the presentation
or omission of O1 and O2 and assess the effect of this informa-
tion on choice. The results from the training phases are pre-
sented in Figure S2. The results from the test are presented in
Figures 2B and 2C in the manner described previously (see Sup-
plemental Information for more details). We were, again, able to1076 Current Biology 25, 1074–1079, April 20, 2015 ª2015 Elsevier Lreplicate the bias in choice toward the action that previously
earned the same outcome as that predicted by the positive pre-
dictors, S1 andS2,when thesewere presented alone (Figure 2B).
Similarly, the same bias was also observed in the presence of the
incongruent compounds (Figure 2C). In contrast, the congruent
compounds, in which information about the omission of an
outcome was presented in the context of its positive predictor,
both biased performance in the opposite direction toward the
action earning the outcome whose omission was not predicted
and elevated performance above baseline (Figure 2C). Evidence
from retardation tests, conducted at the end of the experiment,
and the results of a control study assessing the effects of training
using only one excitor (i.e., S1S3-O1 and S1S4-O2) confirmed
that the effects of S3 and S4 on performance were due to the
specific negative predictions established to those stimuli during
training and were not due to any direct excitatory learning (see
Supplemental Experimental Procedures, Supplemental Discus-
sion, and Figure S2). As such, the current results provide further
evidence that the rats can encode both factual and counterfac-
tual action-outcome mappings and are able to flexibly alter their
choice of action based on predictive information regarding the
occurrence or omission of a specific outcome.
Experiment 3: Forward and Backward Conditioning
Exert Opposing Effects on Choice
Finally, we used backward conditioning, in which the outcome is
presented before the stimulus to reverse the usual causal rela-
tionship, thereby allowing rats to learn that the stimulus predicts
the absence of any immediate outcome. The design of this
experiment is illustrated in Figure 3A. We used three groups of
naive rats. The first group received standard Pavlovian training
in a forward manner similar to that used in the previous studies
and during which two stimuli, S1 and S2, predicted the grain
and sugar outcomes, O1 and O2. For the other two groups of
rats, either the outcomes were presented immediately prior to
the stimuli with a 0-s delay between them (i.e., simultaneous
with stimulus onset), or the outcomes were presented 10 s prior
to their respective stimuli to ensure a more distinct backwardtd All rights reserved
Figure 3. Generating Negative Predictions by Backward Con-
ditioning
(A) The backward conditioning procedure used to generate negative pre-
dictors. The outcomes were delivered immediately after the stimuli in group
Forward (For, n = 24), immediately before the stimuli in group Backward0
(Bck0, n = 8), and 10 s before the stimuli in group Backward10 (Bck10, n = 16).
Abbreviations are the same as those in the legend of Figure 1.
(B) At test, groups Forward and Backward0 exhibited similar behavior (F < 0.1),
as the stimuli biased choice toward the Same action, which earned the
outcomewith which the stimuli had been previously associated (F(1,45) = 10.97,
p < 0.05). The remaining group Backward10 displayed an opposite pattern of
performance (F(1,45) = 10.97, p < 0.05). In this group, a stimulus directed choice
toward the Different action, which was associated with the absence of the
outcome that the stimuli also signaled would not occur (F(1,45) = 7.78, p < 0.05).
No difference was found between the various groups in the absence of the
stimuli (Fs < 2.5). Error bars denote ±1 SEM.arrangement. All rats then received training on the two lever
press actions for the outcomes, such that A1 earned O1 and
A2 earned O2 as in the previous studies. Finally, choice between
A1 and A2 was again assessed in an extinction test in which no
outcomes were delivered. To examine the effect of the stimuli on
choice, we periodically presented either S1 or S2 during the test
for each of the groups.
We anticipated that both the forward and the simultaneous
presentation of outcomes and stimuli would provide sufficient in-
formation to bias choice toward the action associated with the
predicted outcome; i.e., that S1 would bias choice toward A1
and S2 would bias choice toward A2 on test. The important
question was how the rats would respond in the 10-s delay back-
ward-paired group. As both stimuli predict the absence of any
subsequent outcome, it is possible they would generally inhibit
choice. Alternatively, as the stimuli were presented so as to
encourage learning about the absence of one outcome in partic-
ular (O1 in the case of S1 and O2 in the case of S2), we hoped
that the stimulus-specific predictive learning would reveal evi-
dence that the rats had encoded the counterfactual mappings
during instrumental training and that they could use these map-
pings to inform their decision-making on test; i.e., the presence
of S1 would lead the rats to predict the absence of O1 and thus
select A2—the action associated with no O1 during training.
The results from the first two training phases and from a direct
test of the negative predictions produced by the backward con-Current Biology 25, 107ditioning are presented in Figure S3. The results from the test
phase are presented in Figure 3B as described previously (see
Supplemental Experimental Procedures). As in previous experi-
ments, the predictive stimuli established using either forward
stimulus-outcome pairings or the zero-delay procedure were
found to provide sufficient positive predictive information for
the stimuli to bias choice toward the action that in training deliv-
ered the outcome predicted by the stimulus. In contrast, pre-
senting the outcomes 10 s prior to the stimuli produced the
opposite effect on choice. As was observed in the previous
studies, in this condition, the stimuli predicting the absence of
a specific outcome resulted in the rats choosing the action
also associated with the absence of the outcome (Figure 3B).
Together with the prior two studies, this finding provides consis-
tent evidence that during the instrumental training, the rats en-
coded both the factual and the counterfactual action-outcome
relationships. They not only encoded the specific outcome deliv-
ered by an action, they clearly also encoded the outcome that
the action did not produce and were able to use this information
flexibly on test to guide choice.
DISCUSSION
Counterfactual reasoning appears to be a ubiquitous capacity in
humans that emerges very early in life [18–20]. This ubiquity has
been interpreted as evidence that such reasoning is not a
specialized function but, rather, plays a more general role in
the ongoing regulation of action and particularly goal-directed
action [21, 22]. As such, various theories of counterfactual
reasoning have emphasized both its dependency on funda-
mental structural elements of our transactions with the environ-
ment [23] and its functional role as a necessary component in
the management and coordination of ongoing behavioral strat-
egy [6]. In line with its ubiquity and its necessity for the regulation
of adaptive behavior, the current study provides evidence that
the ability to encode counterfactual relationships and to use
them to guide choice can be extended to rats and hence to an-
imals other than humans. By examining the influence of positive
and negative predictions on choice between actions, we
observed that stimuli predicting the absence of particular out-
comes appeared as able to influence action selection as stimuli
predicting their presence. These stimuli were generated by
various inhibitory conditioning procedures and were found
both to bias choice away from the action earning the inhibited
outcome and to elevate the performance of an alternative action
that was associated with the absence of that outcome. The
reversal of the effect of positive prediction by a negative predic-
tor provides direct evidence that rats do not only encode the
factual relationships between actions and outcomes but can
also encode counterfactual relationships, i.e., the outcomes
that their actions do not produce. Furthermore, the flexibility
with which the rats applied these relationships during a single
brief test suggests that they not only encode these relationships
but can reason counterfactually. When faced with information
about the absence of a specific outcome, they did not simply
stop choosing but immediately modified their performance to
select the alternative action.
The reversal of choice and the increase in the selection of
alternative actions produced by negative predictions in the4–1079, April 20, 2015 ª2015 Elsevier Ltd All rights reserved 1077
current experiments constitute a challenge for formal theories of
choice and decision-making, particularly currently popular
computational theories such as those derived from reinforce-
ment learning [24–27]. Generally, these theories hold in common
the view that preference for one action over others is determined
by its relative value. This value is typically calculated according
to the probability and desirability of the earned outcome and is
conferred on the action via the encoding of a specific action
value. The probability and desirability of other outcomes, i.e.,
those that are not delivered by the action, are not considered
in this evaluative process. It follows, therefore, that, in the current
experiments, these theories predict a general reduction in re-
sponding and indifference in choice when a stimulus signaling
the absence of a particular outcome is presented. Certainly, no
current variant of these theories predicts that the performance
of alternative actions will be elevated by these stimuli as
observed in the present experiments. This elevation is, however,
anticipated by assuming the encoding of inhibitory action-
outcome relationships during instrumental conditioning, i.e., by
assuming that the rats encode not only the outcomes that actu-
ally occur but also those that do not occur as a consequence of
an action. Indeed, we propose that, as animals learn that one
action leads to a particular outcome, e.g., A1/O1 or A2/O2,
they also learn the implied counterfactual relationship—that the
action does not lead to outcomes that can be earned by other
actions, i.e., A1/O1 not O2 and A2/O2 not O1.
Although the conditions governing inhibitory action-outcome
associations are yet to be determined (see Supplemental Dis-
cussion), there is a further issue regarding whether the flexible
use of such associations qualifies as ‘‘reasoning.’’ We have
framed our analysis in terms of counterfactual reasoning
because these action-outcome mappings affected choice
without further learning, but their general adaptive significance
also implies such reasoning processes are generally engaged
during instrumental conditioning; e.g., besides the current dem-
onstrations, they would appear to be central to instrumental
avoidance, for which the ability to rapidly select actions that do
not lead to specific consequences has obvious adaptive advan-
tages [28]. Whether rational inference should be considered a
process over and above the implementation of excitatory and
inhibitory action-outcome associations in choice performance
is, however, an open question [29, 30]. In many cases, it can
be shown that associative explanations often sidestep rather
than implement cognitive explanations of behavior [31], whereas
in others, most notably in the case of associative theories of
goal-directed action, it has been more compellingly argued
that constraining associative principles within a specific pro-
cessing architecture can manifest rational cognition [31], and
perhaps the same can be said about the influence of predictive
learning on choice between goal-directed actions in the current
studies.
Although evidence of causal learning in animals has been met
with considerable skepticism [8], the evidence that rats can
make decisions based on predictive information, whether it re-
lates to the presence or absence of significant outcomes or the
necessity of making an intervention [10], suggests that they
can reflect both on the causal consequences of their actions
and also on the consequences that their actions do not cause.
Rather than disengage and inhibit actions altogether, rats appear1078 Current Biology 25, 1074–1079, April 20, 2015 ª2015 Elsevier Lable to actively choose an action that they have learned is not
associated with an outcome that currently available information
suggests will not occur, something they could only do given an
appreciation of, and the ability to act on the basis of, the counter-
factual state of affairs.
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